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1. Introduction 
It has recently become more common for policy-makers to employ micro-based behavioral labor 
supply modeling tools in their ongoing preparations of national budgets, to assess the revenue and 
distributional effects of prospective changes in the tax and transfer system. Meeting this rising demand 
for reliable behavioral micro-simulation models has proven to be a rather difficult task and there is no 
generally accepted best approach to achieving this goal. In this paper, we present a modeling 
framework that has been developed and established to serve Norwegian policy-makers. We discuss 
how our modeling framework meets important criteria, such as having a sound theoretical basis and 
being practical in empirical analysis and simulation experiments, and being able to produce 
satisfactory out-of-sample predictions. 
In the traditional approach (the standard approach), individual labor supply is viewed as a 
choice among feasible leisure and disposable income combinations. This approach has been criticized 
for ignoring an important behavioral aspect, namely that an agent in the labor market typically has 
preferences over job types and may face restrictions on his or her choice among job opportunities and 
hours of work. What complicates the matter further is that these restrictions are typically latent, since 
the researcher is usually ignorant about which agents face restrictions. Although there have been 
several attempts to take into account restrictions on hours of work, see for example Ilmakunnas and 
Pudney (1990), Kapteyn, Kooreman and van Soest (1990), Dickens and Lundberg (1993), these 
approaches are nevertheless centered on the standard approach. Recently, the discrete choice approach 
to labor supply modeling has gained widespread popularity, mainly because it is much more practical 
than the conventional continuous approach based on marginal calculus, see for example van Soest 
(1995) and Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990). For example, with the discrete choice approach, it is easy 
to deal with nonlinear and nonconvex economic budget constraints, unlike in the Hausman model, cf. 
Hausman (1985) and Hausman and Ruud (1984). However, from a theoretical perspective, the 
conventional discrete choice approach represents no essential departure from the standard approach. 
This is because the only new assumption postulated is that the set of feasible hours of work is finite 
and that the random components of the utility function have particular distributional properties. 
Unfortunately, in situations with latent rationing of hours of work choices, the conventional discrete 
choice approach does not seem to be particularly practical, unless the set of potential alternatives is 
small (see, for example, Ilmakunnas and Pudney, 1990).  
In this paper, we propose an alternative approach, based on Dagsvik (1994) and Dagsvik and 
Strøm (2006). See also Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995) and Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm 
(1999). In this alternative approach, labor supply behavior is viewed as an outcome of agents choosing 
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from a set of job ‘packages’, each of which is characterized by an offered wage rate, offered hours of 
work and nonpecuniary (qualitative) attributes describing the nature of the job-specific tasks to be 
performed. Thus, the hours of work of a given job are assumed fixed. In a modeling context where 
job-type is allowed to be a decision variable, workers may face additional constraints because the set 
of available jobs may be constrained. The individual-specific sets of feasible jobs are endogenous in 
the sense that they are determined by market equilibrium conditions and/or by negotiations between 
unions and employers. However, to the individual agent, the set of job opportunities may be viewed as 
given, although it is latent to the researcher. Similarly to the models of van Soest (1995) and van 
Soest, Das and Gong (2002), ours is formulated within a discrete choice framework. Theoretically, 
however, our alternative approach differs fundamentally from this and other previous approaches, 
since it accommodates the concept of ‘job’, and accounts for (latent) restrictions on hours of work and 
job opportunities. In the most general case, the distribution of hours of work can, however, be 
continuous, as demonstrated by Dagsvik (1994) and Dagsvik and Strøm (2006). The alternative point 
of departure we propose represents a powerful modeling strategy because it leads to an empirical 
framework that is flexible and practical to apply, and which we suggest is consistent with crucial 
features of the "true" choice setting. In particular, unlike in standard models, within our approach it is 
easy to account for latent choice restrictions. 
To illustrate the potential of the framework, we conduct an empirical application. This 
application involves formulating and estimating models for the joint labor supply of married couples 
(within a unitary modeling framework), as well as models for single individuals, based on the 
alternative approach mentioned above. Subsequently, we discuss how the modeling framework can be 
applied to undertaking practical simulation experiments to, for example, determine the effect of 
alternative labor market and tax policies. For this purpose, it is important to link the labor supply 
models to a micro-population that is representative of the Norwegian population with respect to a set 
of variables that are taken as exogenously given in the labor supply models. Although our empirical 
application is similar to the ones discussed in Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995), Aaberge, 
Colombino and Strøm (1999) and Dagsvik and Strøm (2006), the discussion in this paper puts more 
emphasis on the integration of the behavioral models into the established system of routines for tax 
policy simulations. A suitable representative micro-population (LOTTE population) has already been 
established by Statistics Norway and has been applied extensively to nonbehavioral tax policy 
analyses, cf. Statistics Norway (2006). Recall that the labor supply models are estimated conditionally 
on given household types and characteristics and given nonlabor income components. By aggregating 
the labor supply models over the micro-population for the different household types, one can obtain 
the (unconditional) distributions of hours of work, tax revenue and disposable income. As a special 
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case, we obtain the respective moments of these variables. In addition, we discuss how the labor 
supply model can readily be extended to a joint model for labor supply and consumer demand. We 
also develop the appropriate analytic formulas for calculating effects from policy reforms (such as 
wage elasticities) conditional on the (chosen) level of income. See also Dagsvik, Locatelli and Strøm 
(2006) for an analogous discussion and analysis based on a labor supply model that allows for choice 
of sector (private and public). They also analyze the effect of specific tax reforms. 
An important part of any behavioral model assessment is an examination of within-sample, 
and in particular, out-of-sample predictive performance. This is because these models are intended for 
predicting behavior under alternative budget constraints that typically differ from those observed in 
the data. In our empirical application, we show that not only are the models able to reproduce the 
within-sample data well, they also produce excellent seven-year-ahead out-of-sample predictions of 
the distribution of disposable income and labor supply (hours of work) in 2003 under appropriate 
updating of the wage rate equations and price levels (inflation). Despite small changes in the budget 
restrictions between 1997 and 2003, the excellent prediction properties of the models indicate that they 
represent structural relations. However, since the changes in the tax system and the wage rates from 
1997 to 2003 are small this prediction exercise does not provide a very serious test of the behavioral 
properties of the models. 
In this paper, we also make a theoretical contribution by adopting a novel approach to dealing 
with unobserved heterogeneity in individuals’ latent choice sets of feasible alternatives. Up to now, 
unobserved heterogeneity in preferences and choice sets has been modeled by applying a particular 
multidimensional Poisson process representation (see Dagsvik, 1994, and Dagsvik and Strøm, 2006). 
The formalism of the Poisson process is somewhat abstract and may appear less intuitive than the 
formulation used in this paper. In contrast, we apply a more conventional formulation in which the 
parameters representing the choice set are specified as random effects. Nevertheless, the two types of 
representation are equivalent in the sense that they yield empirical models of the same structure.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the model. In Section 3, we present 
the empirical specification. In Section 4, we describe the data set. In Section 5, we report the 
estimation results and in Section 6, we discuss the implied wage elasticities.  
2. The modeling framework 
In this section, we present the basic structure of the modeling approach. The models considered in this 
paper differ somewhat from previous models estimated by Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995), 
Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999) and Dagsvik and Strøm (1997). In these papers, wage rates are 
assumed to be job specific and distributed across jobs according to a distribution function that varies 
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across individuals by observable individual characteristics. In contrast, we assume that each individual 
faces only one individual-specific wage rate with a distribution that varies across individuals only by 
observable individual characteristics, similarly to the specification used by Dagsvik and Strøm (2004, 
2006). However, unlike in this paper, Dagsvik and Strøm (2004, 2006) explicitly model the sectoral 
choice (between public and private sector) for married women, given the husbands labor market 
choice, but do not account for the simultaneous labor supply behavior of the spouses.  
2.1. Single-individual households  
Let ( ), ,U C h z  be the (ordinal) utility function of the household, where C denotes household (real) 
disposable income, z indexes market and nonmarket opportunities, or job-types, and h is hours of 
work. Let the positive indices, z = 1 2, , .. .,  refer to market opportunities (jobs) and let 0z =  refer to the 
nonmarket alternative. For a market opportunity (job) z, there are associated hours of work, H(z), and 
unobservable nonpecuniary attributes, such as the nature of the job-specific tasks to be performed, and 
location of the workplace. How these are determined is discussed later. For given hours and wage 
rates, h and w, the economic budget constraint is represented by 
(2.1) ( , )C f hw I= , 
where I is nonlabor income, which includes the income of the husband and f(⋅) is the function that 
transforms gross income into after-tax household income. The income of the husband is treated as 
given. The function f(⋅) captures all details of the tax and benefit system. Our first assumption 
concerns the structure of preferences. The utility function is assumed to have the structure 
(2.2) ( , , ) ( , ) ( )U C h z v C h zε= , 
for 0,1,2,...,z =  where v(⋅) is a positive deterministic function and ε(z) is a positive random taste 
shifter. The random taste shifter is assumed to account for the unobservable individual characteristics 
and nonpecuniary job-type attributes that affect utility, and is allowed to vary both across households 
and opportunities. Thus, this formulation implies that the agent may have preferences over 
nonpecuniary job attributes. For simplicity, we shall use the notation 
(2.3) ( )( , , ) ( , ),≡h w I v f hw I hψ . 
The term ( , , )h w Iψ  is the representative utility of jobs with hours of work h, a given wage rate w and 
nonlabor income I. In addition to (2.1), there are restrictions on the set of feasible market opportunities 
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faced by a specific worker. This is because there are job types for which the worker is not qualified 
and there may be no jobs available for which he or she is qualified. 
Consider first the case in which there is no unobserved heterogeneity in the choice sets. 
Moreover, assume that the wage rates only depend on individual characteristics and do not vary across 
jobs. Although it would be of interest also to allow wage rates to vary across jobs this raises serious 
identification problems, which we currently are unable to deal with in a satisfactory way. Let B(h,w) 
denote the agent’s set of available jobs with hours of work; that is, this set contains those jobs z for 
which ( )H z h= . Let m(h,w) be the number of jobs in B(h,w), which may depend on the wage rate. For 
the nonmarket alternative, one can normalize such that (0, ) 1m w = . The choice sets {B(h,w)} are 
unobserved to the researcher. Let D be the set of feasible hours of work. This set is equal for all 
households. Prior to job search, the individual-specific choice set of jobs may even be unknown to the 
agent and may be revealed through the search process in which the agent learns gradually about his or 
her (equilibrium) choice set. See Dagsvik (2000) for details of the interpretation of choice sets 
unknown to the agent. The random error terms { }( )zε  are assumed to be independent of offered hours 
and wages and are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across jobs and individuals with type 
I extreme value distribution; that is, the cumulative distribution function is equal to ( )exp 1 x− , 
defined for positive values of x. This particular distribution function is consistent with the property 
that the choice of jobs satisfies the assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA). 
Recall that the basic underlying intuition of the IIA assumption is that the agent’s ranking of job 
opportunities from a subset, B (say), within the choice set of feasible jobs with given job-specific 
hours of work and wage rate, does not change if the choice set of feasible jobs is altered.  
Let ( | , )h w Iϕ  denote the probability that the agent chooses a particular job with offered hours 
h, given wage rate w and nonlabor income I (and given individual characteristics) and let D be the set 
of feasible hours. From standard results in discrete choice theory (McFadden, 1984), it follows that the 
probability that a specific job, z (say), within B(h,w) is chosen is given by 
 ( ) ( )( )( )
, ( , )
( , )
( , , ) ( , , )
, , ( ) max max , , ( ) .( , , ) ( , , ) ( , )x D k B x w
x D k B x w x D
h w I h w IP h w I z x w I k
x w I x w I m x w∈ ∈
∈ ∈ ∈
= = =∑ ∑ ∑
ψ ψψ ε ψ ε
ψ ψ
 
The probability of choosing any job within B(h,w) is thus obtained by summing the choice 
probabilities above over all jobs in B(h,w), which yields 
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(2.4) 
( ) ( )( )( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( , )( , )
( , )
( , ) 0,
( | , ) , , ( ) max max , , ( )
, , , , ,
, , (0, , ) , , ,
∈ ∈
∈
∈
∈ ∈ > ∈
= =
= =
+
∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
x D k B x w
z B h w
z B h w
x D z B x w x x D
h w I P h w I z x w I k
h w I h w I m h w
x w I w I x w I m x w
ϕ ψ ε ψ ε
ψ ψ
ψ ψ ψ
 
for 0h > , and similarly when 0h = . The resulting expression is a choice model that is analogous to a 
multinomial logit model with representative utility terms ( ){ }, ,h w Iψ  weighted by the frequencies of 
feasible jobs, ( ){ },m h w . Unfortunately, the frequencies ( ){ },m h w  are not directly observable, but 
under specific assumptions, one can identify m(h,w) and ( ), ,h w Iψ  and estimate their parameters. We 
return to this issue below. Above we have suppressed the fact that the systematic part of the utililty 
function and the terms ( ){ },m h w depend on individual characteristics such as schooling and 
demographic variables. The specification of the functional form and how household characteristics 
enter the model will be considered in Section 3. 
2.2. Married couples 
Taking the unitary model as a point of departure1, the model of joint labor supply for married couples 
is similar to the model for single individuals. Let ( ), , ,F MU C h h z  denote the utility function of the 
household, where hF and hM are hours of work for the female and the male and ( ),F Mz z z=  indexes 
the combination of jobs for the female and male in the household, respectively. Similarly to single-
individual households, we assume that ( ) ( ), , , , , ( )F M F MU C h h z v C h h zε= , which is interpreted 
analogously to the single-individual case above. The budget constraint in this case can be written as 
(2.5) ( ), ,F F M MC f h w h w I= , 
where wF and wM are the respective wage rates for the female and male and f(·) is the function that 
transforms gross income to disposable income for the household. Let ( ), | , ,F M F Mh h w w Iϕ  be the 
joint density of hours of work for the female and male in the household, given wage rates and 
nonlabor income. The empirical counterpart of this density is the fraction of couples in which the 
                                                     
1
 Despite the expanding literature on household decision-making, no consensus has been reached as to what approach is best 
to describe the interaction between husband and wife (see Bergstrom, 1997, Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999, and Jia, 2005, for 
discussion of household behavior models). We follow the traditional ‘common preference model’ and assume the couple 
maximize a joint utility function subject to pooled budget constraints. However, the model can also be interpreted as a special 
case of the collective labor supply model (see Chiappori, 1988, 1992) when bargaining power is not affected by labor market 
decisions.  
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husband works hF hours and the wife works hM hours, within the subpopulation of couples with wage 
rates and nonlabor income equal to ( ), ,F Mw w I . We assume further that the offered hours, HF , to the 
female and HM to the male, are independent. Define 
(2.6) ( ) ( )( ), , , , , , , ,F M F M F F M M F Mh h w w I v f h w h w I h h≡ψ .  
Then, under assumptions similar to those made for single-individual households, it follows that the 
conditional density of ( ),F Mh h , given that 0Mh > , is given by 
(2.7) ( ) ( ), ,0, , ( , ) ( , ), | , , ( , , )
F M M F F F M M M
F M F M
F M
h h w I m h w m h w
h h w w I
M w w I
=
ψϕ , 
for 0, 0F Mh h> > . In addition 
(2.8) ( ) ( )0, , , , ( , )0, | , , ( , , )
M F M M M M
M F M
F M
h w w I m h w
h w w I
M w w I
=
ψϕ  
for 0Fh =  and 0>Mh , where ( , )F F Fm h w  and ( , )M M Mm h w are the number of feasible jobs with 
offered hours hF for the female and hM  for the male, wF and wM are the respective wage rates for the 
female and the male, and 
(2.9)
 
( ) ( ) ( )
0, , 0, , 0
, , 0, ,0, , ( , ) , , , , ( , ) ( , ).F M M M M F M F F F M
y y D y D y x D x
M w w I y w I m y w x y w w I m x w m y wψ ψ
> ∈ ∈ > ∈ >
= +∑ ∑ ∑
 
Note that the expressions in (2.6) to (2.9) are analogous to those for single-individual households. 
2.3. Unobserved heterogeneity in individual choice sets 
In the preceding analysis, we treated the parameters that represent the sizes of the choice sets as 
constant within observationally identical households. This means that unobserved heterogeneity is 
ruled out. Dagsvik (1994) discusses a general framework for dealing with stochastic choice sets that 
accommodates unobserved heterogeneity in the choice sets. This framework is based on a particular 
formal nonhomogeneous multidimensional Poisson process representation. This means that the 
attributes and taste-shifters associated with the respective alternatives are viewed as independently 
scattered realizations according to a location-dependent intensity measure. The reason why the 
locations of the points of the process are random is that the researcher does not observe which 
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attributes are feasible. An additional explanation is that the agent is viewed as boundedly rational, as 
assumed by Thurstone (1927), and only makes his or her choice from a subset of his or her ‘objective’ 
choice set. Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) discuss this framework in the context of labor supply modeling. 
In this paper we discuss an alternative approach. This alternative approach has the advantage of being 
analogous the more traditional random effect type of approach. See also Dagsvik, Strøm and Jia 
(2006) for a similar approach. 
For simplicity, we consider only single-individual households. Assume that the random error 
terms { (z)}ε introduced in (2.2) are replaced by { (z)}ε , which are defined by 
(2.10) (z) (z) (z)ε = ε κ . 
The terms ( ), 0,1,2,...,z zε = are i.i.d. with type-I extreme value distribution, as in Subsection 2.1. We 
interpret these terms as random to the agent himself in the sense that it is difficult for him to assess 
utility precisely once and for all. Thus, in replications of identical choice settings, the individual may 
vary his or her tastes in a manner that is not predictable by him or her. In contrast, the term (z)κ is 
interpreted as representing the value of the unobservable attributes of job z that are perceived as 
perfectly predictable to the agent. However, { (z)}κ  is not observed by the researcher, and is 
represented as a random variable. We assume that { ( )}zκ and { (z)}ε are independent. Let 
{ }( )| , , ( , ),h w I m h w h D′ ′ϕ ∈ denote the conditional probability of supplying h hours of work given the 
wage rate, nonlabor income and{ }( , ),m h w h D∈ . Similarly to (2.4), it follows immediately that the 
conditional density of supplied hours of work, given{ ( )}zκ , has the structure 
(2.11)  
( ) { }( )
{ }( )
( , )
( , )
( , , ) ( ) max max | ( )( , , ) ( )
( , , ) ( , )| , , ( , ), ,( , , ) ( , )
x k B x w
z B h w
x D
h w I z zx w I zP
h w I m h wh w I m h w h D
x w I m x w
ψ ε κψ ε
ψϕ
ψ
∈
∈
∈
=
′ ′= ∈ =
∑
∑
 
 
 
where 
 
( , )
( , ) ( )
z B h w
m h w zκ
∈
= ∑ . 
It follows from (2.11) that the set { }( , ),m h w h D∈ represents a sufficient set of random variables for 
the latent choice sets{ }( , ),B h w h D∈ . Note that when ( ) 1zκ = , (2.11) reduces to (2.4). It follows 
immediately that the unconditional choice probability of working hours h is given by 
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(2.12) ( ) { }( ), , , ( , ),h w I E h w I m h w h D′ ′ϕ = ϕ ∈ , 
where the last expectation is taken with respect to { }( , ),m h w h D∈ . 
A challenging issue is how to characterize the distribution of the terms { }( , ),m h w h D∈ . Our 
approach to this challenge is to postulate a reasonable invariance property, which is discussed in 
Appendix B. It can be demonstrated that the postulated invariance assumption, together with the 
requirement that ( )m h  is positive, imply that the distribution of ( )m h is strictly stable and totally 
skew to the right. Recall that the class of Stable distributions represents a generalization of normal 
distributions. In particular, a general version of the central limit theorem yields the class of Stable 
distributions (see, for example, Embrechts, Klüppelberg and Mikosch, 1997). We refer to Appendix B 
for a detailed description of the family of Stable distributions. Thus, given that ( , )m h w , h D∈ , are 
independent and distributed according to a strictly Stable distribution that is totally skew to the right, it 
is shown in Appendix B that 
(2.13) 
, 0
( , , ) ( , ) ( , , ) ( , )( , ) ( , , ) ( , ) (0, , ) ( , , ) ( , )
x D x D x
h w I m h w h w I m h wh w I E
x w I m x w w I x w I m x w
α
α α
∈ ∈ >
 
ψ ψ ϕ = = ψ ψ + ψ  ∑ ∑

 , 
for 0h > , and similarly for 0h = , where 0 1< α < is a parameter of the Stable distribution and 
log ( , )m h w is equal to log ( , )E m h wα , apart from an additive constant, and with the normalization 
(0, ) 1m w = . Thus, we have obtained the remarkable result that the structure of the choice probabilities 
is invariant under aggregation across unobserved choice sets (with suitable reinterpretation of the 
opportunity distribution), except for a power transformation of the systematic part of the utilities. In 
other words, we have demonstrated that the structure of the labor supply choice probabilities given in 
Section 2.1 is consistent with the stochastic choice sets of feasible jobs provided that the systematic 
part of the utility function v has a functional form that is invariant under arbitrary (increasing) power 
transformations. An analogous argument applies to the model for married couples. As will be clear 
from the empirical specification below the parameter α cannot be identified and can therefore be 
normalized to one. Note furthermore, that ( , )m h w can no longer be interpreted as the number of 
feasible jobs with hours of work h. 
2.4. Equilibrium and identification issues 
We have not yet discussed the structure of the opportunity measures { }( , )m h w  in equilibrium. 
Although a thorough analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, we nevertheless provide 
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some clarification of the issue in this section. In what follows, we assume that m(h,w) is 
multiplicatively separable in h and w; that is, ( , ) ( ) ( )m h w g h wθ=  for 0h > . See Dagsvik and Strøm 
(2004) for a justification of this assumption. Without loss of generality, we can normalize so that g(h) 
is a probability density. Within the setting discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 the term θ(w) is 
interpreted as the number of jobs that are feasible to the individual, and g(h) is interpreted as the 
fraction of feasible jobs that have offered hours, H(z), equal to h. With this notation, we have 
(2.14) 
, 0
( ) ( , , ) ( )( | , ) (0,0, ) ( ) ( , , ) ( )
∈ >
=
+ ∑
x D x
w h w I g hh w I
I w x w I g x
θ ψϕ
ψ θ ψ
, 
for 0h > , and  
(2.15) 
, 0
(0,0, )(0 | , ) (0,0, ) ( ) ( , , ) ( )
∈ >
=
+ ∑
x D x
I
w I
I w x w I g x
ψϕ
ψ θ ψ
, 
where we have used the fact that (0, , ) (0,0, )w I Iψ ψ= . We call θ(w)g(h) the opportunity density 
(individual specific). However, within the extended setting discussed in Section 2.3 the interpretation 
of ( )g h and θ(w) is no longer so simple since these terms now depend on preferences through {κ(z)}. 
We therefore could call θ(w)g(h) the "quality adjusted" opportunity density, but for simplicity we shall 
still continue to use the terminology "opportunity density" in this case. As mentioned in Section 2.1 
the choice probabilities in (2.14) and (2.15) also depend on socio-demographic variables that affect the 
systematic term of the utility function, v(C,h). 
Although we have assumed that the agent’s taste-shifters are (stochastically) independent of 
offered hours and wage rates, the distribution of wage rates and the opportunity density will depend on 
the distribution of the preferences due to equilibrium conditions. In other words, the market forces that 
regulate the balance between supply and demand, be it a market-clearing regime or not, are assumed to 
operate solely at the aggregate level. Consequently, the opportunity density depends on the production 
technologies of firms as well as on the contracts and wage-setting policies of unions and firms. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss fully how the opportunity density, θ(w)g(h), through market 
equilibrium processes, depends on the systematic part of the utility function, ψ(⋅). Consequently, the 
estimated model can only be applied to simulate behavior conditional on the opportunity density. In 
our empirical application below, we assume that the density function g(h) is exogenously given in the 
short run. In the Norwegian economy, normal working hours are typically determined once or twice 
every decade. In contrast, the mean level of offered wages for different groups are, in the unionized 
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part of the economy, set annually. The parameter θ(w), which represents the size of the choice set of 
feasible jobs, will vary over the business cycle. Dagsvik (2000) considers equilibrium conditions in a 
setting in which the labor market is viewed as a matching game where workers and firms search and 
compete in order to obtain the best possible match with a potential partner. He shows that the choice 
model has the same structure as does the model given in (2.14) and (2.15), where 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )w g h b w g h Vθ = . Whereas g(h) is determined by preferences and institutional regulations 
determined infrequently, typically once or twice every decade, b(w) is the systematic term in the 
conditional profit function of the firm and V is the total number of vacancies in the economy. That is, 
b(w) is a function that measures the representative profit from hiring the agent at wage rate w. The 
decomposition, ( ) ( )w b w Vθ = , implies that when V is observed, one can express the model in terms of 
V, a representative utility function and a representative conditional profit function. No additional 
equilibrium conditions need be imposed because the vacancy variable V is a sufficient statistic for the 
equilibrium relations. If cross-sections for several periods over which there are business cycle 
variations are available, one can use V as an instrument to control for the restrictions that arise because 
of the equilibrium conditions. In addition to changes in prices and wages over the business cycle, 
variations in V capture effects that operate through the equilibrium relationships, including destruction 
and creation of jobs. However, it is difficult to identify the structure of b(w) because it depends on 
both the wage rate and those variables that represent worker qualifications, such as the length of 
schooling and experience. Specifically, b(w) will be decreasing in w, whereas the (mean) effect of 
length of schooling may be ambiguous because, for some jobs, the worker may be overqualified. 
Therefore, in the empirical analysis that follows, we use a reduced form specification of θ(w).  
2.5. Comparison with the standard approach 
In the standard approach to labor supply modeling, the researcher typically chooses a specification of 
an individual labor supply function (hours of work function) that is consistent with the maximization 
of a quasi-concave utility function in disposable income and leisure, subject to the economic budget 
constraint. Except for the Hausman approach, the budget constraint is usually approximated by a 
suitable smooth version that implies a convex budget set. Suppose for example that the labor supply 
function has the structure 
(2.16) ( ) ( )= + + + + h w h X I hα β γ δ ε ,  
when 
(2.17) (0) (0) 0+ + + + >w X Iα β γ δ ε , 
14 
and 0h =  otherwise, where ( )w h  is the marginal wage rate, ( )I h  is so-called virtual nonlabor 
income, X is a vector of individual characteristics that affects preferences, ε is a random error term 
with a normal distribution N(0,σ) and α, β, γ, σ and δ are unknown parameters. The inequality in 
(2.17) is a condition for working. In general, when the tax system is nonlinear, the marginal wage rate 
and virtual income depend on hours of work and hence, they are endogenous. As a result, one cannot 
estimate the model by using OLS. Additional complications follow from the condition given by (2.17) 
and from the fact that the wage rate is not observed for those who do not work. Now, suppose that the 
parameters of this labor supply function have been estimated. Then, to derive hours of work when 
(2.17) holds, given the wage rate and nonlabor income, one needs to solve for h in the nonlinear 
equation given in (2.16). Let us denote by ih = ( ), , ,i i i iF w I X ε  the resulting labor supply function of 
worker i; this is the solution of (2.16) for hours of work, where wi is the wage rate and Ii is nonlabor 
income for worker i. Then, one can simulate the conditional distribution of labor supply (hours of 
work) by drawing T i.i.d. error terms { }iε  from the normal distribution N(0,σ) and one can compute 
the simulated conditional distribution as  
(2.18) ( ) ( )
( ){ }; , , ,
1| , , , , ,
i i i k
i i i i i i i k
k F w I X y
P h y w I X F w I X
Tε
ε
≤
≤ = ∑ . 
The summation on the right-hand side of (2.18) is taken over all k such that supplied hours are less 
than or equal to y. The empirical counterpart of (2.18) is the fraction of agents with characteristics 
( ), ,i i iw I X  that supply hours of work of less than or equal to y. The corresponding unconditional labor 
supply distribution can be obtained by computing 
(2.19) ( ) ( )1 | , ,i i i i i
i
P h y P h y w I X
N ∈Ω
≤ = ≤∑  , 
where Ω  denotes a representative micro-population of size N. In principle, this can be done with 
general utility specifications and the corresponding labor supply functions, but, as mentioned above, 
this will in most cases be rather cumbersome in practice. The reason for this is that the class of utility 
functions that imply explicit and tractable labor supply functions, such as the one in (2.16), is rather 
limited and, hence, in more general cases, one is forced to work with nonlinear specifications. Thus, 
even when the budget constraint is simplified to ensure a convex budget set, the estimation and 
simulation of labor supply responses is not straightforward. 
In contrast, the modeling framework applied in this paper differs in several aspects from the 
standard approach. First, it allows for preferences to depend on nonpecuniary job attributes and, 
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second, it accounts for possible constraints on the set of feasible job offers. In addition to these 
theoretical aspects, this framework has the advantage that it does not require an explicit derivation of 
an individual labor supply function. Instead, the distribution (probability density) of labor supply is 
modeled directly and expressed explicitly as a function of the systematic term of the utility function. 
As a result, one need not simplify the budget constraint (2.1). In addition, the systematic term of the 
utility function, v(C,h), can be quite general because this approach does not depend on the derivations 
of, and solutions to, first-order conditions. Furthermore, the simulation of distributional effects is 
straightforward because, as mentioned above, the model is represented explicitly in terms of 
probability densities, cf. (2.14) and (2.15). 
The conventional discrete choice approach also shares many of the practical features discussed 
above because no marginal calculations are needed, cf. van Soest (1995). See also the review by 
Creedy and Kalb (2005). Specifically, it enables the researcher to straightforwardly apply quite 
general specifications of the utility function and the budget constraint. However, as mentioned in the 
introduction, it does not accommodate the feature that preferences typically depend on nonpecuniary 
job attributes, and because it is basically a version of the standard approach, it cannot deal with latent 
restrictions on choice opportunities.  
3. Empirical specification 
As discussed in Dagsvik and Strøm (2004, 2006), we can in general only identify the product 
( ), , ( ) ( )F M F F M Mv C h h g h g h  nonparametrically. To disentangle ( ), ,F Mv C h h from ( )F Fg h  and 
( )M Mg h , we assume that the clustering of hours of work at part-time and full-time work is due to 
technological organizational constraints and/or regulation of hours introduced by unions and/or the 
government. The terms ( )F Fg h  and ( )M Mg h  are meant to capture this aspect of the labor market in 
the highly unionized Norwegian economy. Thus, through parametric identification, our model implies 
that the observed concentration of hours of work around part-time and full-time work arises because 
there are institutional constraints in the labor market rather than because individuals have strong 
preferences for full-time and part-time work. Note that there is no need to identify the terms 
( ), ,F Mv C h h , ( )F Fg h  and ( )M Mg h separately if one is only interested in simulating the effects of 
changes in wage rates, the budget constraint and demographic variables affecting preferences. This 
identification is, however, crucial if one also wishes to simulate the effect on labor supply of changes 
in institutional hours of work restrictions. 
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We consider only models that are conditional on the male working. This is because it is likely 
that many males who do not work do so either because they cannot obtain suitable work or because 
they have health problems. 
In the empirical specifications to be estimated, we assume that the density of offered hours, 
( ), ,kg h k F M= , is uniform except for peaks at full-time and part-time hours. Because we established 
above that the opportunity densities may depend on preferences, we allow them to vary across 
household types; that is, those for single males, single females and married couples. Uniformly 
distributed offered hours are consistent with the assumption of a perfectly competitive economy. The 
full-time peak in the hours distribution captures institutional restrictions and technological constraints 
and hence market imperfections in the economy. We specify seven intervals for hours of work. The 
medians of the intervals are 315, 780, 1,040, 1,560, 1,976, 2,340 and 2,600. Thus, the set D consists of 
these points. The full-time peak occurs in the fifth interval, in which the median is 1,976 annual hours. 
The part-time peak is related to the third interval, which has a median of 1,040 annual hours. These 
intervals correspond to the most common agreements of what constitutes full- and half-time annual 
hours of work. To deal with the problem of wage rates being unobserved for those who do not work 
and of wage rates possibly being correlated with the taste-shifters in the utility function, we estimate 
instrumental wage rate equations. For , ,=k F M  we assume that 
(3.1) k k kW w η=  , 
for 1,2j = , where { }ikη  are random terms that are lognormally distributed; that is, log , , ,k k F Mη =  
are independent and normally distributed, ( )0, kN σ . We assume that log kw is a linear function of 
length of schooling, experience and experience squared. When the wage rate equations are inserted 
into the model for married couples and when the error terms in these equations are integrated out, we 
obtain the following empirical model for the joint labor supply density for married couples 
(3.2) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
, ; , ,
, | , , ,
, ,
 
=    
F M F F M M F F M M F
j F m F M
F F M M
h h w w I g h g h
h h w w I E
M w w I
ψ η η θϕ
η η
 
for 0, 0F Mh h> > , and similarly for 0, 0F Mh h= > . The expectation in (3.2) is taken with respect to 
the error terms in the wage rate equations. In practice, we compute the expectation by simulation when 
estimating the model. The term θF is assumed to depend on the wage rates solely through the length of 
schooling. In this context, we assume that: 
(3.3) 1 2log = +F F Ff f Sθ , 
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where S is the length of schooling. 
We choose ( )⋅v  to be of the form 
(3.4)         
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
3
4
34
4
0 0 2
2 5 6 7 8 9
1 3
2 0
10 11 12 13 14
4
00
15
34
log , ,
10 1 1
log log 6 6
1log (log ) 6 6
11
,
−    
− −
− −    = + + + + +       
 
− −
+ + + +  +   
 
− − 
− −  +      
F M
F
F F
M
M M
FM
v C h h
C C L L
A A CU CO
L LA A CU CO
L LL L
α α
α
αα
α α α α α α
α α
α α α α α
α
α
αα
 
where , , ,kA k F M=  is age for gender k, CU6 and CO6 are the number of children below or equal to 
and above the age of six, respectively, C is given by (2.7), , , ,kL k F M=  is leisure for gender k, with 
0 1 3,650,k kL L h− = −  and , 1,2,...,15j jα = , are unknown parameters. Observe that we have 
subtracted from total annual hours a ‘subsistence’ level, amounting to 5,110 hours, which allows for 
sleep and rest. This corresponds to about 14 hours per day reserved for sleep and rest. The term C0 is 
an income subsistence level. We have chosen C0 to be approximately NOK 40,000 N , where N is 
the number of persons in the household. Disposable income, C, is measured as the sum of the annual 
wage incomes of the woman and her husband after tax, household capital income after tax and child 
allowances. The tax functions and the child allowance rule are described in Appendix F of Dagsvik 
and Strøm (2004). If 1 3 41, 1, 1,< < <α α α  2 0>α , and the term in front of leisure is positive, andα9 is 
sufficiently large, then log ( ),v C h  is increasing in C, decreasing in ( )h  for fixed C and strictly 
concave in ( ),C h . Dagsvik and Strøm (2004) provide a theoretical justification of the functional form 
in (3.4). 
To control for selection bias when estimating the wage equations, we apply the estimation 
procedure proposed by Dagsvik and Strøm (2004). Conditional on the estimated parameters of the 
wage equations, the remaining parameters of the model are estimated in a second stage by using the 
maximum likelihood procedure. It would also have been desirable to allow η1 and η2 to be correlated. 
However, because this complicates the computations considerably, we have chosen to leave this 
18 
challenge for another occasion. This two-stage procedure has the added advantage that it reduces the 
measurement error caused by a negative correlation between hours of work and wage rates. 
4. Data  
The data are obtained by merging the Labor Force Survey of 1997 with two different register data sets 
that contain additional information about incomes, family composition, children and education. The 
concepts applied in the Labor Force Survey are consistent with the official statistics from Statistics 
Norway and the recommendations of the International Labor Organization (ILO). Note that persons 
were asked about their attachment to the labor market during a particular week in the first quarter of 
1997. 
Information about actual and formal working time in main and secondary jobs and information 
on background variables, such as demographic characteristics and occupation, was also obtained from 
the Labor Force Survey by using personal identification numbers. Conditional on labor market 
participation, respondents are also asked whether they consider themselves to be self-employed or 
employees, and based on this information, we have excluded self-employed persons from the sample 
used for estimation. Working time is measured as formal hours of work in both the main and second 
job. If this information is missing and the respondent is participating in the labor market, information 
about actual working time is used.  
Information on education is obtained from the National Education Database, which is a register 
database that can be linked to the Labor Force Survey by using personal identification numbers. 
Whereas the Labor Force Survey yields detailed information about employment and hours of work, it 
does not provide information about annual labor incomes that can be used in the calculations of 
(average) gross wage rates and nonlabor income. To obtain this information, we utilized the Tax 
Return Register (which includes more detailed information about, for example, employee income, 
self-employment income, taxable pensions). These data can be linked to the Labor Force Survey by 
using the personal identification numbers. Nominal hourly wage rates are measured as labor incomes 
(for main and second jobs) divided by (normal) total annual hours of work (for main and second jobs). 
The sample includes persons aged between 26 and 62. The motivation for this is that for women below 
26 years of age, education is an important activity, and many of those older than 62 years of age have 
retired. The number of children includes all children aged less than 19. A person is defined as working 
if he or she works at least one hour per week. Households in which one of the adults has income from 
self-employment that exceeds NOK 80,000 are excluded. Also excluded are households in which one 
of the adults works more than 80 hours, or receives a wage rate of less than NOK 50 or more than 
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NOK 400. In Table 1, we report the summary statistics for the sample used to estimate the labor 
supply model. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics for individuals in the sample, 1997 
 Couples Single Male / Single Female 
 Mean  SD Min Max Mean  SD Min Max 
Male age 44.9 8.5 26 62 37.1 9.2 26 62 
Male education 12.6 2.7 6 20 12.3 2.6 6 20 
Male experience 25.3 9.1 1 46 17.7 9.8 1 46 
Male nonlabor income 6,776 12,503 0 79,518 10,723 15,661 0 79,197 
Male wage rate 155.3 54.6 50.4 400 137.7 47.3 50.1 387.4 
Male weekly hours of 
work 38.5 5.4 2 80 37.9 6.7 2 75 
Female age 42.6 8.5 26 62 38.9 9.8 26 62 
Female education 12.1 2.6 0 20 12.3 2.7 0 20 
Female experience 23.6 9.5 2 51 19.6 10.7 1 49 
Female nonlabor 
income 18,671 17,415 0 79,752 16,578 22,287 0 79,627 
Female wage rate  120.2 37.8 50 385.4 121.7 40.2 50.2 373.5 
Female weekly hours of 
work 27.3 12.5 0 60 43.2 14.4 0 77.7 
No. of children 0–7 0.48 0.78 0 4     
No. of children 8–18 0.78 0.93 0 4     
Number of observations 2,511 Male: 2,095 Female: 1,907 
5. Estimation results  
5.1. Estimates of the wage rate equations 
In this section, we report estimates of the wage rate equations. The wage equation is specified in a 
conventional way; that is, the logarithm of observed wage rates, log , , ,kW k F M=  is assumed to 
depend linearly on experience, experience squared and the education level. Experience is defined as 
age minus years of schooling minus seven. As shown in Table 2, the selection bias in the wage 
equations is negligible. Since the selection bias is negligible, we have not reported the corresponding 
bias for males. The estimates of the variances of the error terms in the wage equations are large. Thus, 
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it seems important to account for the error terms in the wage equations when estimating the structural 
model.  
 
Table 2. Estimates of wage equations, females and males, 1997 
Males Females Females (selection 
corrected) Variables 
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. 
Constant 4.0897 0.030 4.1082 0.031 4.1145 0.038 
Experience in 
years/10 0.2234 0.018 0.1429 0.017 0.1409 0.018 
(Experience in 
years/10)2 –0.0382 0.004 –0.0225 0.003 –0.0221 0.004 
Education in years 0.0440 0.002 0.0388 0.017 0.0386 0.002 
Married 0.0548 0.009 –0.0223 0.008 –0.0213 0.009 
Log(P)     0.0132 0.045 
Variance 0.3029 0.2755 0.2755 
No. observations 5,448 5,074 5,074 
R2 0.15 0.10 0.10 
 
5.2. Estimates of labor supply probabilities 
Estimates of the parameters of the structural choice model are reported in Table 3. For married 
couples, all exponents (α1, α3 and α4) are significantly less than unity and, thus, the estimates imply 
that the deterministic part of the utility function is quasi-concave. We note that the parameter 
associated with the interaction term between male and female leisure is not significantly different from 
zero. Hence, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the deterministic part of the utility function is 
additively separable in the leisure of the female and that of the male. The marginal utilities of 
consumption and leisure (for all relevant ages) are positive. The marginal utilities of female and male 
leisure are convex and increasing functions of age, and imply that the marginal utility of leisure for 
females increases up to the age of 33 and then decreases, and that the marginal utility of leisure for 
males is increasing up to age 36 and thereafter decreases. The marginal utility of female leisure 
depends on the number of children in each age group, unlike the marginal utility of male leisure, 
which does not depend significantly on the number of children. The implication of the exponent 
1α being significantly different from zero is that agents care not only about relative consumption levels 
(beyond subsistence), absolute levels also matter. Note that the measure of the number of available 
jobs for females, Fm , depends positively on the length of schooling (S) (both for married and single 
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females). Note also that the full-time and part time peaks in the opportunity density of hours for males 
are substantially higher than the corresponding peaks for females. This is probably because of 
differences in preferences between females and males, which is possible according to the 
interpretation of the opportunity density given in Section 2.3. The results for single males and females 
are similar to those for couples, except that the coefficients associated with leisure are not significantly 
different from zero. Figures 1 and 2 display the observed and (aggregate) predicted values of 
participation and hours of work for married couples; note that the model predicts these aggregates 
quite well. The corresponding figures for single females and single males are given in Appendix D. 
McFadden's 2ρ  given in Table 3 also confirms the good fit of the models.   
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Table 3. Parameter estimates of the labor supply probabilities 
Married Couples Single Males Single Females  Parameter 
Estimate S.E. Estimate  S.E. Estimate  S.E. 
Preferences:       
Consumption        
    Exponent 1α  0.6643 0.054 0.7919 0.206 0.5656 0.109 
    Scale 10−4
 
α2 1.8411 0.352 0.3509 0.126 0.3424 0.075 
Female leisure        
    Exponent α3 –0.8334 0.182   –4.2964 0.776 
    Constant α5 11.8387 1.888   0.4491 0.355 
| α6 –12.5285 1.945   –0.5867 0.469 
    Log(age/10) squared α7 5.2456 0.733   0.2181 0.174 
    No. children below or  
    equal 7 years α8 0.9682 0.168     
    No. children above 7 years
 
α9 0.5075 0.094     
Male leisure        
    Exponent α4 –1.8043 0.430 0    
    Constant α10 3.8929 1.112 8.2806 4.110   
    Log(age/10) α11 –4.3054 1.142 –11.2454 6.509   
    Log(age/10) squared α12 1.6682 0.444 4.3352 2.454   
    No. children below 6 years α13 0.0547 0.051     
    No. children above 6 years
 
α14 0.0083 0.029     
Leisure interaction α15 0.2047 0.147     
The parameters θF; 
θ +F F1 F2log f f S=         
    Constant fF1 –3.5041 0.435   –5.3010 0.995 
    Education fF2 1.2389 0.366   2.8963 0.925 
Opportunity density of  
offered hours        
    Male full-time peak  2.3769 0.086 2.5580 0.082   
    Female full-time peak  1.4380 0.296   1.7042 0.076 
    Male part-time peak  1.0960 0.063 –0.1767 0.206   
    Female part-time peak  0.5622 0.067   0.3832 0.097 
Number of Observations   2,511  2,095  1,907  
Log likelihood  –5,706.5  –1,841.3  –2,272.9  
McFadden’s 2ρ  
 0.44  0.55  0.43  
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5.3. Comparison with the standard discrete choice labor supply model 
In this section, we compare our model with a version of the standard discrete choice modeling approach 
(van Soest, 1995). To this end it is assumed that the utility function for married couples has the 
structure 
(5.1) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , ,F M F M F MU C h h v C h h C h hε= , 
where v is the systematic term and ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , ,F M F M F MU C h h v C h h C h hε= , and ),,( MF hhCε is a 
positive random error term. As above, hours are discrete, with Dhh MF ∈, . In addition (2.1) holds. 
This means that after the budget constraint has been taken into account, the error term will, for a given 
household, only depend on C through the couple’s hours of work. The systematic term v is assumed to 
be a quadratic polynomial, given by 
(5.2) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
1 1 1 2
2 2
2 2 3 4
log , ,
.
F M L F M M F F L F FM F M
M M F F L F M L F F
v C h h C h h C h h
h h C h C h
α γ γ β β α γ γ β
β β α γ γ α γ γ
= − − + + + − − +
+ + + − − + − −  
To account for observable differences in preferences between households, 1Mβ and 1Fβ  are typically 
specified as functions of personal and household characteristics in the same way as in (3.4). The wage 
equations used are the same as those estimated in Section 5.1. The estimation procedure for this model 
is the same as that discussed in Section 3 and the estimates are given in Table C.1 of Appendix C. 
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Figure 1. Predicted and observed distributions of hours of work for married males, 1997 
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Figure 2. Predicted and observed distributions of hours of work for married females, 1997 
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Figures 1 and 2 show that our model predicts the labor supply probabilities much better than does the 
standard discrete choice model with the quadratic polynomial utility specification. The main problem 
with the standard discrete model is its inability to account for the concentration of part-time and full-
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time hours of work. For a further discussion and comparison of our type of approach with the standard 
discrete model, see Dagsvik and Strøm (2004, 2006).  
6. Model simulations 
6.1. Practical simulation of effects of policy reforms 
A major motivation for developing behavioral models is the need for assessing the impact of policy 
reforms such as for example changes in direct and indirect taxes, the distributions of length of 
schooling and wage rates. The modeling approach discussed in this paper represents a convenient 
framework for simulating measures of behavioral responses to such reforms. Particular measures of 
interest are, (i) wage elasticities,  (ii) income distribution, (iii) hours of work distribution, (iv) indexes 
of inequality in income (Gini coefficient), (v) compensating variation (CV), (vi) labor force 
participation, and (vii) transitions between labor market states.  By means of the models estimated 
above these measures, apart from (vii), can be calculated and used to compare alternative policy 
regimes. As regards (vii) one cannot simulate transitions, say, from one year to the next, because the 
model does not include transition probabilities. To establish structural transition probabilities to this 
end will be a task for research in the future.  
 The practical simulations with our model differ from simulations based on the conventional 
approach. In the conventional approach the hours of work equation (including draws from the 
distribution of the error term) is used to simulate the respective (stochastic) realizations for each 
individual. Similarly, one can simulate disposable income for each household by combining the 
simulation from the wage equation and the labor supply equation. In contrast, simulations based on the 
modeling approach presented in this paper do not produce individual simulations. Instead the 
respective probability distributions under alternative policy regimes are calculated, from which one 
can calculate relevant measures, such as for example (i) to (vi). Although it is possible to simulate 
individual realizations as in the conventional approach, this is less convenient and also less precise 
because it implies additional error due to simulation uncertainty, unless one uses a very large number 
of draws from the distribution of the error term. The reason why it is unnecessary to simulate 
stochastic individual responses is because measures such as the theoretical income distribution, hours 
of work distribution, the Gini coefficient, mean wage elasticities, mean wage elasticities conditional 
on a given income decile, and the distribution of CV, is because these measures can be derived 
directly from the model. To realize how this can be done we have carried out selected simulation 
exercises below, namely the calculation of different type of wage elasticities, and within-sample and 
out-of-sample prediction of the hours of work- and income distribution. As an example, consider the 
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calculation of the Gini coefficient, G (say), for disposable income. By well known results the Gini 
coefficient can be expressed as 
(6.1) 
( )
( )
0
0
( ) 1 ( )
1 ( )
F y F y dy
G
F y dy
∞
∞
−
=
−
∫
∫
 
where F(y) is the cumulative distribution of disposable income. In Appendix A it is demonstrated how 
one can simulate F(y). Subsequently, one can use (6.1) to simulate G. 
 As regards policy experiments and the calculation of CV we refer to Dagsvik, Locatelli and 
Strøm (2006) who have carried out simulations of the effect of selected policy reforms. In particular, 
they demonstrate how one can apply the method of Dagsvik and Karlström (2005) to calculate the 
mean and the distribution of CV that follows from these reforms. 
6.2. Aggregate wage elasticities 
In this subsection, we report selected wage elasticities. We have chosen to calculate elasticities that 
take into account both the systematic terms and the unobservables in the model. This means that we 
account for how the mean of the distribution of labor supply is affected by changes in, say, wage 
levels. We refer to these elasticities as aggregate elasticities because they take into account 
unobserved and observed heterogeneity in the population. In Tables 4 and 5, we report what we term 
aggregate uncompensated elasticities. They are calculated as follows. For each household, we simulate 
the change in the choice probabilities of working and the expected hours of work for females and 
males following a 10 per cent increase in wage rates. Subsequently, we aggregate over the sample to 
obtain the corresponding change in the mean probability of working and mean expected hours of 
work. To obtain elasticities, we multiply these figures by 10 and divide by the respective mean 
probability of working and the mean expected hours of work. 
 In general, the tables show that the uncompensated wage elasticities are moderate for married 
females but small for males and single females. For married females, the own wage elasticity of the 
probability of working is equal to 0.33, which means that if the wage rates of married females were to 
increase by 5 per cent (say), then the aggregate fraction of married female working would increase by 
1.5 per cent. If both male and female wage rates were increased, then the corresponding elasticity of 
the probability of working is equal to 0.22. This means that the fraction of married females working 
would increase by one per cent in this case. 
/  
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Table 4. Uncompensated wage elasticities for married couples 
  
Female 
base value 
Male base 
value 
Female 
own wage 
elasticity 
Female 
cross wage 
elasticity 
Male own 
wage 
elasticity 
Male cross 
wage 
elasticity 
Female 
elasticity 
with 
respect to 
both wage 
rates 
Male 
elasticity 
with 
respect to 
both wage 
rates 
Whole sample 0.89  0.33 –0.14   0.22  
Lowest decile 0.87  0.42 –0.18   0.28  
2nd to 8th decile 0.90  0.33 –0.14   0.22  
Proba-
bility of 
working 
Highest decile 0.92  0.25 –0.09   0.17  
Whole sample 1,601 2,015 0.28 –0.09 0.08 –0.02 0.20 0.06 
Lowest decile 1,581 2,002 0.29 –0.09 0.07 –0.02 0.21 0.05 
2nd to 8th decile 1,602 2,015 0.28 –0.09 0.08 –0.02 0.20 0.06 
Mean 
hours of 
work 
condi-
tional on 
working Highest decile 1,618 2,030 0.27 –0.08 0.09 –0.01 0.19 0.08 
Whole sample 1,444  0.61 –0.23   0.42  
Lowest decile 1,383  0.71 –0.26   0.48  
2nd to 8th decile 1,445  0.61 –0.22   0.42  
Un-
condi-
tional 
mean 
hours of 
work Highest decile 1,500  0.52 –0.18   0.37  
 
Conditional on working, the wage elasticity of mean hours of work is 0.28 for married females. Note 
also that the elasticities conditional on income groups decrease slightly by income for females but 
increase slightly for males. However, the elasticities with respect to change in both wage rates remain 
practically constant over income groups. The corresponding unconditional elasticities for the females 
measure the effect on total mean hours of work of a change in wages. Table 4 shows that the 
unconditional elasticities for married females range from 0.71 in the lowest decile to 0.52 in the 
highest decile of disposable income. The figure for the whole population is 0.61. This means that a 5 
per cent increase in the wage rate of married females increases total mean annual hours of work by 44 
hours. 
 
Table 5. Uncompensated wage elasticities for single individuals 
 
Male base 
value 
Male wage 
elasticity 
Female 
base value 
Female 
wage 
elasticity 
Probability of working  
 
0.97 0.023 
Mean hours of work conditional on working 1,982 0.03 1,766 0.002 
Unconditional mean hours of work   1,720 0.004 
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6.3. Out-of-sample prediction 
As shown in Section 5, our model fits the data well. A more interesting test of the performance of the 
model is to check the extent to which the model is able to predict out-of-sample labor supply behavior. 
In policy simulation experiments, for predicting the effect of tax reforms for example, we are also 
interested in assessing how the distribution of disposable income, taxes paid, and inequality measures 
are affected by the reform. Detailed instructions on how to construct the distribution of disposable 
income based on the predicted choice probabilities can be found in Appendix A. In this section, we 
report results from out-of-sample simulation experiments.  
To this end, we use two different samples from Norwegian populations to perform out-of-
sample prediction exercises. In the first exercise, we use the most recent available data from the same 
source as our sample for estimation, namely the Labor Force Survey of 2003, merged with the Tax 
return register for the same year. The advantage of using this sample is that we can construct all vari-
ables in the same way as we did for the estimating sample and apply the same sample-selection rules. 
For the second prediction exercise, we use different data, which were obtained by selecting 
data from the income and property statistics for households (LOTTE population), which is a represen-
tative sample survey of households, in which information from various registers is combined with 
household composition data from interviews. The only sample selection criterion for this simulation is 
the requirement that the individuals should be wage earners between 26 and 62 years of age. In this 
data set, we have detailed income data but no information about hours of work. Thus, we only com-
pare the actual and predicted distributions of different income variables. 
Two parameters are important when using the model estimated for one year (the base year) to 
predict labor market behavior in another year (the simulation year): These are the wage growth rate 
and the inflation rate, both measured from base year to simulation year. We use the observed wage 
growth rate and the wage regression for the base year to generate the wage rate in the simulation year. 
It is also necessary to adjust incomes in the simulation year by using the inflation rate to compute real 
income in the base year for undertaking the model simulations.  
Although the out-of-sample predictions for labor supply behavior are not as good as the 
within-sample predictions, our model predicts the proportions in each category well. As expected, the 
standard discrete choice model predicts poorly in this case. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the observed and 
predicted distributions of labor supply for married couples based on the first sample, which is de-
scribed above.  
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Figure 3. Predicted and observed distributions of hours of work for married males, 2003 
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Figure 4. Predicted and observed distributions of hours of work for married females, 2003 
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Figure 5 shows the observed and predicted disposable income distribution based on the 
LOTTE data. In this case, our model predicts well, which is an indication of its good performance. 
However, we need to be careful when interpreting this result. The distribution of disposable income 
depends mainly on the wage rate equations and the labor supply model (conditional on wage rates). 
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We have found that the shape of the distribution of disposable income appears to be quite robust with 
respect to moderate changes in the distribution of hours of work. Thus, it seems that the distribution of 
the error term in the wage rate equation is of crucial importance in this context. For example, the stan-
dard discrete choice model yields a similar distribution of disposable income to the one obtained from 
our model. Thus, a poor fit of the distribution of disposable income is not necessarily a sign of a 
poorly fitting underlying behavioral model, but could result from a misspecified distribution of the 
error terms in the wage rate equations. In fact, a closer look at the wage rate equations reveals that the 
assumption of normally distributed error terms in the wage rate equations seems restrictive. In simula-
tions not reported, it is found that the wage rate equations are not capable of reproducing the right tails 
of the distribution of observed wages in the 1997- sample. This is not surprising because it is well 
known that the right tail of the lognormal distribution is not heavy enough to capture the right tails of 
most income distributions. In fact, a closer look at Figure 5 reveals that the right tail of the empirical 
density seems fatter than the tail of the corresponding simulation.  
 
Figure 5.  Observed and predicted density of disposable income for married couples, LOTTE 
2003 
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6.4. Consistency with consumer demand relations 
So far, we have not discussed explicitly the relationship between the labor supply model and the 
demand for consumption goods. In this section, we discuss how the labor supply model developed 
above can be made consistent with consumer demand relations and can thus be used to simulate the 
joint effect of changes in direct and indirect taxes as well as of changes in wage rates and commodity 
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prices. First, note that the utility function U(C, h, z) can be interpreted as conditional indirect utility 
given (C, h, z). This means that one can view the agent’s choice behavior as a two-stage process: In 
the first stage, the agent chooses the preferred job, from which disposable income is earned. In the 
second stage, the agent allocates disposable income to consumption of different commodities. In the 
first-stage choice, the agent takes into account that the second stage allocation will be optimal 
(according to her or his preferences) given the prices of the commodities. 
Recall that the estimated empirical specification of v(C, h) has the structure 
(6.2) ( ) ( ) ( )1 21 0 2 0log ,v C h a C C a L Lα α= − + − , 
where a2 depends on demographic household characteristics. We assume that 1α , 2a  and 2α  are 
independent of the vector of commodity prices, p. Consequently, only the term ( ) 11 0a C C α−  matters 
for the second-stage allocation. The terms 1a  and C0 are functions of the commodity prices. Hence, 
our utility function U(C, L, z) can be interpreted as a conditional indirect utility function, and can be 
written as 
(6.3) ( )
1
20
1 2 0
( )log ( , , ) log ( )( )
C C pU C h z a a L L z
P p
∗  −
= + − +  
α
α
ε , 
where 11 1/ ( )a P p aα∗ = , and P(p) and C0(p) are linear-homogeneous, concave, decreasing functions of 
the commodity prices p. In the context of the consumer demand relations, (6.3) is equivalent to an 
indirect utility function of the Gorman Polar form, cf. Gorman (1953). The corresponding demand 
relations follow from Roy’s identity. 
Thus, when the functions C0(p) and P(p) are determined (and suitably calibrated to be 
consistent with the subsistence level and the estimate of a1 in the period for which the model was 
estimated) one can carry out policy simulations to assess the effect of changes in goods prices, taxes, 
indirect taxes and wage rates. (Note that indirect taxes enter the model through transformations of 
prices.) In fact, an extensive consumer demand system for Norway that is consistent with the above 
formulation has been developed by Statistics Norway. A brief descriptive summary of this demand 
system is given in Aasness, Bye and Mysen (1996), see Statistics Norway (2006) for more detailed 
information. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have discussed the application of a particular modeling framework for empirical 
analysis of labor supply behavior with a view towards model assessment and practical use in policy 
simulation experiments. An essential feature of the modeling framework is that it allows for latent job 
opportunities and restrictions on the latent set of feasible jobs. Furthermore, we have developed a 
novel approach to accommodating unobserved heterogeneity in the latent choice sets of job 
opportunities.  
To demonstrate the applicability of our approach, we estimated models for single females, 
single males and married couples. The estimated models reproduce the data within the sample well. 
The (uncompensated) wage elasticities implied by the models are small or moderate in magnitude. In 
addition, the wage elasticities computed conditional on deciles of disposable income are found to 
decline gradually by decile. To test the performance of the model, we have used it to predict out-of-
sample behavior in 2003 on two different data sets. The results show that our model is able to predict 
the actual distribution of hours of work and disposable income quite well.  
For purposes of comparison, we also have estimated a standard discrete choice model with a 
quadratic polynomial specification of the structural term of the utility function for married couples. 
The fit of this estimated model is poor, as is its out-of-sample predictive performance. This is mainly 
because this model cannot explain the observed peaks at full- and part-time hours of work.  
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Appendix A 
Simulation of the distribution of disposable income for single households  
Recall that disposable income for single households is given by: 
(A.1) ( ),C f hW I= , 
where the agent’s wage rate W is predicted by the wage equation 
(A.2) logW X β η= + , 
where η is assumed normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2. Let us extend the notation 
introduced in Section 2.1 by letting ( | , , )h W I Zϕ  be the probability density of realized hours of work 
(that is, hours of work of the chosen job), conditional on the wage equation, nonlabor income I and the 
characteristics Z that affect preferences. Furthermore, let ( ), , 1K hW I y =  if ( ),f hW I y≤  and zero 
otherwise. Then 
(A.3) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
1 1
, , , , exp , ,
exp , , , ,
1
exp , , exp , ,
h
N T
i r i i r i i
i r h
P C y P f hW I y EP f hW I y W I Z EK h X I y
E K h X I y h W I Z
K h X I y h X I Z
NT
= =
≤ = ≤ = ≤ = +
= +
≅ + +
∑
∑∑∑
β η
β η ϕ
β η ϕ β η
  
where N is the size of the micro-simulation population and T is the number of i.i.d. draws from the 
normal distribution with variance σ2. The simulation of the conditional distribution given the 
characteristics of a specified population group is the same. In addition, the simulation of disposable 
income for couples is analogous to the case considered above. 
Simulation of conditional aggregate elasticities given that disposable income is 
restricted 
We now consider the derivation of the joint probability of hours of work and disposable income 
(consumption). This simultaneous choice probability is needed for computing conditional elasticities 
such as the wage elasticity of labor supply, given the level of consumption. We only consider the case 
of single-individual households. Let H denote the chosen hours of work, that is, hours of work in the 
chosen job, and let 
 ( ) ( ), | ,h y I P H h C y Iϕ = = ≤ . 
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Implicit in the above definition is that we only condition on the explanatory variables in the wage 
equation. The error terms in the wage equations will be integrated out. From (A.1), it follows that 
(A.4) 
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ){ }
, | , ,
, , | , ,W
h y I P f hW I y H h I
E P f hW I y H h W I h W I
ϕ
ϕ
= ≤ =
= ≤ =

 
where EW denotes the expectation with respect to W, where W is the wage rate. Note that, when 
( ),H W  are given, then ( ),f hW I  is nonstochastic and the probability 
 ( )( ), , ,P f hW I y H h W I≤ =  
is equal to zero or one. Hence, we can express (A.4) as 
(A.5) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }, | , , | ,Wh y I E K hW I y h W Iϕ ϕ= . 
Similarly 
(A.6) ( ) ( ) ( )0, | 0, , 0 | ,Wy I K I y E W Iϕ ϕ= . 
In practice, the probability in (A.5) is computed by stochastic simulation as follows. Let rW  be given 
by the wage equation 
(A.7) log r rW X β ση= + , 
where , 1,2,..., ,rj r Mη =  are independent draws from ( )0,1N . If M is large, then 
(A.8) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
, | , , | ,
M
r r
r
h y I K hW I y h W I
M
ϕ ϕ
=
≅ ∑ . 
Once we have obtained ( ), |h y Iϕ , it follows immediately that, for example 
(A.9) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
2 1
1 2
2 1 0 2 0 1
0,
, | , |
, ,
, | , | 0, | 0, |
x x D
h y I h y I
P H h y C y I
x y I x y I y I y I
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
> ∈
−
= < ≤ =
− + −∑
 
    . 
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Equation (A.9) represents the conditional density of chosen hours given that disposable income lies 
within the interval ( )1 2,y y . From this expression, we can compute the corresponding conditional 
mean hours of work and different types of conditional elasticities, such as the conditional elasticity of 
mean hours given that disposable income lies within some interval. We can also use (A.8) to simulate 
the marginal distribution of disposable income because this distribution is given by 
(A.10) ( ) ( )
0,
( | ) , | 0, |
x x D
y I x y I y Iϕ ϕ ϕ
> ∈
≡ +∑  . 
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Appendix B 
Properties of the family of Stable distributions 
A Stable distribution with parameters α, σ, β and µ, is often denoted by ( , , )Sα σ β µ . The parameter α 
is restricted such that 0 2α< ≤ , and is an index that characterizes the heaviness of the tails, whereas σ 
is a positive scale parameter that is similar to the standard deviation. The parameter β is restricted to 
the closed interval [−1,1] and it characterizes the skewness of the distribution; 0β =  implies 
symmetry whereas 1β =  ( 1)β = −  implies that the distribution is totally skewed to the right (left). 
The parameter µ is a location parameter that coincides with the expectation when 1α > , whereas the 
expectation is not defined when 1α ≤ . When 2α = , the distribution reduces to the normal 
distribution, in which case, β vanishes. However, when 2α < , the variance is infinite. It also follows 
from condition (ii) that 0µ = . If we impose (i), it follows in addition that 1α <  and 1β = , cf. 
Samorodnitsky and Taqqu (1994). When µ = 0 we say that the distribution is strictly stable. 
Assumptions that yield positive strictly stable random variables 
These are the following: (i) ( , ) 0m h w > ; (ii) any positive value of ( , )m h w is possible, (iii) for any 
hours of work, h1 and h2, and nonnegative constants, b1 and b2, then 1 1 2 2( , ) ( , )b m h w b m h w+  should 
have the same distribution as 1( , )cm h w , provided that ( )1,m h w and ( )2 ,m h w  are independent, where 
c is a positive constant that may depend on h1, h2, b1 and b2. The motivation for (i) is obvious: unless 
this condition is satisfied, for some hours of work, the conditional choice probabilities would be zero 
or negative. Condition (ii) also seems highly plausible. Condition (iii) implies that for any 1 2, ,..., rh h h  
within D, the distribution of the conditional aggregate choice probabilities, given by 
 { }( )
1
| , , ( )
r
k
k
h w I z
=
ϕ κ∑ , 
which are random variables because they depend on { }( )zκ  through { }( , ),m h w h D∈ , across 
unobservable choice sets belongs to the same family of distributions as the conditional choice 
probabilities, { }( ), , ( ), 0,1,..kh w I z zϕ κ = . In other words, requirement (iii) implies that the 
distribution of the conditional choice probabilities is invariant under the aggregation of alternatives 
(hours of work). Since the aggregation level within the total set of feasible hours is somewhat 
arbitrary, it seems reasonable that the distributional properties of the model do not depend critically on 
the partition of the set of feasible hours into alternatives. It follows that from the theory of Stable 
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distributions that Assumption (iii) implies that ( , )m h w is stably distributed, see for example 
Samorodnitsky and Taqqu (1994). Furthermore, Assumption (i) implies that α < 1 and β = 1. Finally, 
Assumption (iii) implies that µ = 0. 
 
Proof of equation (2.15) 
For expositional simplicity, we simplify notation in proving the result. Consider the choice among M 
discrete alternatives. Alternative j has utility j j j jU v m ε=  , where , 1,2,..., ,j j M=ε  are i.i.d. positive 
random variables with c.d.f. ( )exp 1 x− , for 0x > , where {vj} are positive deterministic terms and 
,1,2,..., ,jm M are independent with mj and distributed according to ( ),1,0jSα σ , where jσ  is a 
positive parameter. Moreover, { }jm  and { }jε  are independent.  
Consider the c.d.f. of j jm ε . Because jm and εj are independent, it follows from Proposition 
1.2.12 in Samorodnitsky and Taqqu (1994, p. 15) that 
(B.1)   ( ) ( ) ( )1exp expj j j j j j
j
xP m x EP m E m x k x
m
α αε ε σ− −
 
≤ = ≤ = − = −   
    
where ( )1 cos 2k απ= . However, this implies that j jm ε  has the same distribution as αα εσ /1/1 jjk . 
Furthermore, this implies that the utility function Uj is equivalent to the utility function j j j jU v
α ασ ε=  
because αjUk
1−
 has the same distribution as jU
~
. According to results that are well known, it follows 
that 
(B.2) { }( )max j jj k k k
k k
k
v m
P U U m
v m
= = ∑
  , 
and that 
(B.3) ( )max j jj k k
k k
k
v
P U U
v
α α
α α
σ
σ
= = ∑  . 
Consequently, it follows that 
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(B.4) 
{ }( )
( ) ( )
max
max max .
j j
j k k k
k k
k
j j
j k k j k k
k k
k
v m
E EP U U m
v m
v
P U U P U U
v
α α
α α
σ
σ
  
= =   
= = = = =
∑
∑
 
 
 
The result in (2.15) follows immediately from (B.4). It only remains to prove that log log .j jE m = σ  
Because j jm ε  has the same distribution as αα εσ /1/1 jjk , if follows that 
log log log log logj j j jE m E k Eε σ α ε α+ = + + . Moreover, log jε  has the distribution 
( )exp exp( )x− − , which has a mean equal to Euler’s constant, 0.5772. Hence, 
log log logj j jE m c c m= + = + σ α , where c is a constant. Hence, the proof is complete. 
 Q.E.D. 
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Appendix C 
Estimation results from the traditional model 
 
Table C.1. Parameter estimates for the traditional discrete choice model 
 Parameter Estimate S.E. 
Preferences:    
Consumption α1 0.6865 0.2072 
Consumption squared α2 0.0019 0.0017 
Female leisure βF1    
Constant βF11 28.3200 2.1910 
(age/10) βF12 –5.8966 3.0280 
(age/10) squared βF13 0.9364 0.3421 
No. of children below 6 years βF14 3.1722 0.5000 
No. of children above 6 years
 
βF15 1.4945 0.2893 
Female leisure squared
 
βF2 –22.4610 1.7702 
Male leisure βM1    
Constant βM11 97.2747 1.9108 
(age/10) βM12 –4.0438 1.8206 
(age/10) squared βM13 0.6137 0.2501 
No. of children below 6 years βM14 –0.7105 0.6104 
No. of children above 6 years
 
βM15 –1.0290 0.4812 
Male leisure squared
 
βM2 –115.1640 0.6064 
Leisure interaction βMF 48.5725 1.8799 
Consumption and female leisure interaction α4 0.6034 0.0810 
Consumption and male leisure interaction α3 0.9158 0.1260 
Fixed cost of working for female γF 1.4744 0.1655 
Fixed cost of working for male γM NA  
Number of observations   2,511  
Log likelihood  –6,484.1  
McFadden’s 2ρ   0.368  
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Appendix D 
More results for in-sample and out-of-sample predictions  
Goodness of fit of the model 
 
Figure D.1. Predicted and observed distributions of hours of work for single females, 1997 
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Figure D.2. Predicted and observed distributions of hours of work for single males, 1997 
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Out-of-sample predictions for 2003 
Figure D.3. Predicted and observed distributions of hours of work for single males, 2003 
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Figure D.4. Predicted and observed distributions of hours of work for single females, 2003 
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Figure D.5. Predicted and observed density of disposable income for single males, 2003, LOTTE 
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Figure D.6.  Predicted and observed density of disposable income for single females, 2003, 
LOTTE 
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